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Introduction
One observes a particular and characteristic 
feature pertaining to varieties of discussions 
on relation between science and religion which 
have taken place during the last thirty years: no 
visible progress and no change in their content. 
For many years conferences and published papers 
either consider scientific and educational ideas 
in the perspective of the historical Christianity 
or, alternatively, theological truths are adjusted 
to the standards of new forms of scientific 
thought. The main result of such discussions is 
that scientists continue their research as if the 
“dialogue” between science and theology did not 
exist at all, whereas theologians, being conscious 
of their limited capacity in the advancement of 
theology in view of modern scientifically based 
secularisation, sometimes defend their convictions 
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in a narrowly historical and linguistic fashion 
effectively being forced into such a dialogue by 
an implicitly atheistic stance of its opponents. 
Sometimes the “dialogue” resembles not an 
attempt of reconciliation of science and theology, 
but a more articulate and precise demarcation 
between two types of experience, where the 
scientific component becomes a criterion of this 
demarcation. In other words, the “dialogue” 
transforms into a more detailed description of the 
difficulties of conducting of such a “dialogue” in 
general. The language employed in all discussions 
by theologians and scientists sometimes seems 
to be manifestly different, appealing implicitly 
to some premises which either cannot be linked 
to each other or have a common ground. What 
is the reason for that? From our point of view 
it must be sought in the lack of philosophical 
clarification of the very possibility of that 
which is called the “dialogue” or “mediation” 
between science and theology, or science and 
religious experience in general. In this article we 
explicate the difference between scientific and 
religious experience in philosophical terms by 
demonstrating that this difference pertains to the 
basic characteristic of the human condition and 
that the intended overcoming of this difference 
under the disguise of the “dialogue” represents, 
in fact, an existentially untenable enterprise. 
Discussions on the differences in experience of 
the world and experience of God are profoundly 
timely for further articulation of the sense of the 
human condition, but not for its change.
At the very inception point of the problem of 
science and religion, or the dialogue (mediation) 
between science and theology, the very possibility 
of relation of the scientifically given (data) 
and that which can be qualified as the given in 
experience of the Divine, is implicitly assumed.
Usually such a possibility finds its foundation 
in a mundane approach to the problem linked 
to the natural desire to establish a hierarchy of 
sensible images and intellectual representations of 
reality in a single consciousness without making 
delicate distinctions in the means of access to 
these givens and the degree of their rationality, 
that is in the modi of their phenomenality.1 
One must take into account that such a 
philosophical insensitivity to various modi 
of representation of experience can lead to a 
reaction when the very possibility of comparison 
or mediation between scientific ideas and 
theological representations will be rejected as 
having no sense because the comparison is applied 
to the fundamentally “non-uniform things” thus 
having only an abstract character, comparable 
with the exercise of imagination and having 
no existential meaning. Such a reaction could 
be exercised by sceptically oriented scientists, 
as well as by sincerely believing Christians. 
However, the stance on mediation, as well as that 
one, which rejects its possibility, both contain a 
hidden philosophical premise, whose content is 
not spelled out, but implicitly predetermines the 
result of comparison of theology and science. 
All those, who deny the legitimacy of religious 
experience and its comparison with science 
implicitly justify their position by adopting a 
certain ontological commitment with respect to 
being of the world and being of God which, as 
such remains unclarified. In contradistinction to 
them, all those who employ the arguments based 
in religious experience, remain unable to express 
their position by using philosophical language that 
neutralises the objection of “atheists”. However 
both approaches, either the first one that denies 
the importance of theology, or the second one, 
alternative to this, and diminishing the necessity 
of taking into account rational arguments from 
the positive sciences in order to strengthen the 
properly religious conviction, are both weak 
from the philosophical point of view, that is from 
the point of view of the rational representation 
of the holistic structure of the living experience 
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of humanity manifesting itself through the 
difference between science and theology.
In order to clarify the latter point one can 
consider the situation when the fervent apologists 
of faith pose the question of the following kind: 
why one must take into account physical ideas 
whilst studying and developing theology? 
Theology deals with the specifically human way 
of existence, mystical, experience, liturgical life 
and Church, an ideal of salvation etc. and is not 
reduced simply to a mythology of the world? To 
what extent a Christian must be acquainted with 
the scope of knowledge of the physical world in 
order to be deified? One can employ a simple 
empirical response to this question by pointing 
out that the very possibility of theology (as 
experience of the Divine (independently of how 
the givens of this experience are treated)), that 
is the reality of its own existence and existence 
of its representations is determined by the 
possibility of existence of the incarnate carries 
of this theology (that is human persons). In other 
words, in order to theologise one must have 
necessary physical and biological conditions for 
existence of theologians, the conditions which, 
as it is not difficult to understand, are ultimately 
rooted in cosmic conditions. Cosmology and 
earthly physics (together with biology) explicate 
these necessary conditions. From here one 
infers a simple conclusion that any theological 
proposition (in thought or speech), expressing 
experience of the Divine contains explicitly a 
truth about the world as such, that world where 
this experience takes place. It is not difficult 
to see that the argument employed by us is 
ontological in the sense that it appeals to physical 
matter as the ground of existence which justifies 
the contingent facticity of theology.
If now sceptically motivated scientists 
reverse the previous question and ask as to “Why 
one needs theology for physics?”, the response 
will be the following. Physics, in its cosmic 
dimension, argues about the factual state of affairs 
in the universe without clarifying the sense of its 
contingent facticity, that is, without clarifying 
the sense of the sufficient conditions responsible 
not only for the outcomes of the physical laws in 
order to have a given display of the universe, but 
also for the very possibility of knowledge and 
explication of the universe by human persons. 
Physics operates without giving an account as to 
how and why the study of the world (from micro-
particles to cosmological scales) forms a gift to a 
physically limited humanity. Theology, although 
it does not explain this fact, at least interprets 
it by pointing out that it is only human beings 
have the rational capacity of transcending the 
physically finite, that is to go beyond their own 
bodies and immediate life-world by integrating 
in their finite consciousness the representation 
of the infinite and intransient. Consciousness and 
reason form such characteristics of the human 
condition in the universe that cannot be explained 
by reducing them to the physical (ontological) 
and whose elucidation and interpretation is 
possible only through the appeal to theological 
anthropology of the Divine image. This leads the 
argument for justification of theology beyond the 
world order and its ontology. Correspondingly, 
any cosmological vision of the world is implicitly 
imbued with theology, for it is based in a Divine 
gift of faith in reality of good creation of Good 
God, as well as in the gift of the possibility of 
thought and linguistic articulation of the universe 
as a thanksgiving offering of creation back to the 
Creator. The ontological argument for the very 
possibility of theology, employed by us whilst 
responding to the first question, is typical for any 
metaphysical justification based on the principle 
of causality (consciousness is epiphenomenon of 
the physical), or on the principle of the sufficient 
reason. One also needs to add the principle of 
knowability, that is a transcendental stance on 
finitude of knowledge (knowledge is limited by 
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the conditions of corporeality (embodiment)) and 
the limits of access to infinity.
As to the response to the second, opposite 
question that existence of consciousness and its 
rationality is linked to the idea of God, it does 
not have the same philosophical clarity as it 
was in the first case. Namely, the appeal to the 
idea of God implies a propensity to faith which 
is not evident and convincing in the context of 
the transcendental stance on the possibility of 
knowledge. Here one introduces a theological 
argument which appeals to those givens of 
experience that are radically different in 
comparison with what is given in physics and 
cosmology. These givens of experience are related 
to the fact of the human existence understood 
not only at the physical (natural) level, but also 
as personal (hypostatic) consciousness. Here one 
implicitly appeals to such a modus of experience 
which is not rooted in the natural (ontological), 
but is related to a different modus of the given. 
It is the difference in the modus of the given, 
revealed by us in the course of the argument in 
favour of impossibility of avoiding cosmological 
insights in theology on the one hand, and in the 
implicit appeal to the theology of communion (for 
the possibility of cosmology), where the very fact 
of life turns out to be an inaugural revelation, on 
the other hand, that points towards an asymmetric 
relation between the metaphysical interpretation 
of the possibility of theology as an empirical and 
discursive representation of the living experience 
(based in the power of scientific arguments) and 
properly “theological justification” of science 
on the basis of the immediate givens of the 
human existence, whose metaphysical instability 
(as passivity and affectivity by nature, time, 
flesh etc.) and transcendence (as an attempt to 
unfold life’s hidden foundation) turns out to be 
a phenomenological pointer to the realm of the 
Word and Spirit, lying in the foundation of life 
as such. The “dialogue” between science and 
theology thus becomes a discourse of clarification 
and explication of the difference in the ways of 
appearance and access to the givens in science 
and theology in one and the same human subject.
How to make philosophically  
the distinction in the modi of the given  
in the natural sciences and theology  
and what are the limits of such  
a distinction?
The philosophical criterion of the difference 
in the modi of the given in the natural sciences 
and theology can be formulated in the following 
way. Any scientific research and any theory 
assume the acceptance (whether explicitly or 
unconsciously) of the system of metaphysics 
(metaphysica generalis), that is ontology 
(ontologia), so that such a research implies that 
it studies an object which must exist beforehand, 
that is to be an existent (ens). This requirement 
holds for every specialised metaphysics, that is for 
specific sciences, as well as for the representation 
of God in philosophical theology (theologia 
rationalis) (which is distinct from theology 
understood as experience of communion with 
God, that is from theology of revelation). On the 
one hand, metaphysics deals with the issue of 
existence of God (and here the whole drama of 
possible proofs of this is unfolded), whereas on 
the other hand, there is a question about essence 
of God. One notes that the requirement for the 
metaphysical certainty can also be applied to 
theology understood as historical or linguistic 
tradition (whose foundation is in communion). 
For example, there can be a metaphysical demand 
for the existence of Biblical events in order the 
latter to be justified from the point of view of the 
historical sciences. Similarly, the corresponding 
fragments of the sacred texts must receive their 
interpretation and thus objectivisation through 
their qualification by the rules of linguistics and 
the sciences of the languages. However, when we 
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use term theology in a proper sense, we depart 
from the metaphysically defined definition of its 
subject as if it is positioned in a sort of underlying 
substance. One means the theology as communion 
with God, so that in this case the most burning 
question is how to establish the difference on 
the metaphysical basis between philosophical 
theology and theology of communion. The 
provisional response to this question can be 
formulated like this: the difference consists in 
the extent of appearance (phenomenality or 
presence, display) of beings (existents) (that 
is, their “positivity”) concerned, and of the 
ways of ontic verifications in philosophical 
theology and theology of communion. Here 
one can recall Heidegger who in his famous 
article Phänomenologie und Theologie of 1928 
considered theology (including also a non-
philosophical theology) as “wholly autonomous 
ontic science” because of its “positivity” and 
then, as a consequence, its dependence on the 
analytics of Dasein, considered as a fundamental 
ontology. This, according to Heidegger, confirms 
the primacy of ontology with respect to theology, 
as well as with respect to all special sciences.2 
Generalising, one can say that the difference 
between ontic sciences (majority of the human 
sciences) and ontological sciences (for example, 
physics, whose ontology is based in physical 
substance and rubrics of space and time which 
constitute the precondition for any articulations 
of reality) presupposes the difference in ontology 
behind these sciences, and the hierarchy of 
those sciences follows from the “hierarchy” of 
ontologies (assuming that one can define one 
ontology as more fundamental than another). 
Physics is modest in claiming that its ontology 
is associated with the corporeal function of man. 
Then there is a question as to whether exists 
such a philosophical system that could assert the 
universal ontology, which can be placed in the 
foundation of both the sciences and theology, that 
ontology which could subordinate either theology 
of communion or philosophical theology? One 
can rephrase this question in a paradoxical way: 
since ontology (and its primacy with respect to 
the ontic sciences) has sense in a metaphysical 
system, what can be left of such an ontology 
at the era of the “end of metaphysics”. One can 
refer to Heidegger who stopped using the term 
“metaphysics” in order to «to think Being without 
beings», that is to “think Being without regard 
to metaphysics” (Heidegger, 1972: 24), when 
he refused being in favour of event (Ereignis) 
(“Being vanishes in event” (Heidegger, 1972: 
22 (translation corrected)), “Being would be a 
species of event, and not the other way around” 
(Heidegger, 1972: 21 (translation corrected))3. 
Essentially he says that one cannot treat theology 
of revelation (as events of communion with 
God) in the context of the ontic status of these 
events as if they would be only specific historical 
events. If previously the notion of event was 
shadowed by the background of metaphysics, so 
that an event needed original ontology in order 
to take place (for example, in physics, there must 
be space-time for events to happen, and these 
events form the structure of the former), the 
modern development of phenomenology leads 
event beyond the existent, beyond being. One 
cannot assign the modus of the already conceived 
existence to an event. Event can be described as 
the consummation of that, whose essence did 
not give the possibility of its foreseeing as if one 
could foresee the inconceivable impossible from 
the perspective of the conceivable possible (that 
is from within metaphysics with its principle 
of causality)4. Finally, if even the ontology of 
Dasein is doubted as a pretender for the universal 
ontology, what kind of an alternative could 
be proposed as the foundation of theology? If 
the very development of philosophy and the 
mutable character of the fundamental physical 
structures in the natural sciences places man 
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and his thought into the “non-metaphysical” (or 
post-metaphysical) situation, can this thought use 
an ontological criterion in order to carry out the 
distinction between science and its philosophical 
appropriation on the one hand, and theology of 
communion on the other? The implied answer 
is “no”, so that philosophy as such must extend 
towards appropriating phenomena with the event-
like structure which cannot be appropriated 
within the frame of metaphysics.
Here one approaches new possibilities 
of a philosophical reflection upon that which 
is metaphysically impossible. The essence of 
event is that it predetermines and redefines all 
possibilities of existents in their being and it is in 
this sense that it can be assigned an ontological 
status. One follows from here that the more a 
phenomenon takes place in its phenomenality 
as an event, the more it doubts its metaphysical 
modus of being, for its sheer possibility follows 
from its effective metaphysically understood 
impossibility. Theology of communion 
confirms this, for it deals with the events whose 
impossibility witnesses to what is expressed in 
the Bible in words “nothing is impossible for 
God” (Gen. 18:14; Lk. 1:37). One implies here 
the events such as creation of the world out of 
nothing, the Incarnation of the Word-Logos of 
God in flesh, the Resurrection etc. These events 
resist the possibility of their non-contradictory 
comprehension (in a metaphysical sense) 
preventing the formulation of their identity status 
(on the ground of the principle of contradiction), 
that is, in different words, they challenge ontology 
and its definition of being.
The “essence” of events of creation of 
the world, the Incarnation and Resurrection is 
exactly that that they do not reduce to that which 
follows ontological law patterns. These events 
make possible that which is not presented on the 
ontological level, which is not identical to itself 
and whose existence contradicts its essence. One 
can express the same by saying that “essence” of 
these events contradicts to itself, for referring to 
a biblical case when God “calls into being things 
that are not” (that is calls into being non-existent 
as existent, as if non-existent would exist) 
(Rom. 4:17). It is in this latter sense that such 
events par excellence as creation, incarnation 
and resurrection, one can say, acquire a “meta-
ontological status” because they (events and all 
existents involved in them) contradict to the laws 
implied by ontology.
The world of things (the universe) receives 
a new interpretation in accordance with that 
which grants being, so that the world acquires 
being in that moment (event) that exceeds the 
measure of any possible definition of the existent. 
Being created the existent receives its being from 
God, not resulting from the laws, outlined by 
thought in rubrics of ontology. In light of such a 
reversal, when ontology (as the possible) becomes 
subordinated to events (as sheer impossibility), 
the relation between theology of communion 
and metaphysics experiences an inversion, so 
that the latter becomes to be determined by the 
former. By this, one neutralizes an ontological 
criterion in establishing a relation between 
philosophy, philosophy of science and theology, 
by introduction “into play” another criterion, 
dealing with the difference between the possible 
and impossible, that is the difference between 
that which can be a matter of experience and 
that which cannot. The implied criterion is 
based on the assumption that one can apriori 
state the limits of rationality, that is to formulate 
conditions for possibility and impossibility of 
experience. It is because of the Copernican 
turn by Kant that the finite reason defines the 
infinite, claiming impossible its knowledge on the 
grounds of the limited cognitive capabilities. The 
finitude and limitedness of reason thus assume 
the functioning of the principle of transcendental 
apriori. If the finite structure of consciousness 
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does not have a transcendental status, it cannot 
legitimately make distinction between what 
is possible and what is impossible. It follows 
from here that the difference between scientific 
philosophy and philosophy in general, on the one 
hand, and theology, on the other, on the basis of 
distinction between the possible and impossible, 
can be articulated in principle only if philosophy 
and corresponding philosophy of science 
function as being part of the transcendental 
discourse, that is under the assumption of the 
transcendental subject who exercises such an 
articulation. This transcendental stance finds its 
justification in that trend in philosophy of science 
which shows that the formation of views on the 
structure of physical reality is intimately linked 
to the conditions of access to this reality through 
experiment and mathematical expressibility5. 
Since the transcendental stance is present in 
the fabric of phenomenology, it is the latter that 
can be chosen as a methodology for making 
an enquiry into the theoretical legitimacy of 
theology. Phenomenology, being an efficient 
method (among other philosophical trends) of 
maintaining the difference between philosophy 
(and methodology of science) and theology is 
capable of supporting this status unless the 
inherent transcendentalism is not itself subjected 
to a historical and epistemological correction.
Thus one cannot conduct a reasonable 
demarcation in the subject matter of science and 
theology without an appeal either to ontology 
or transcendental interpretation of possibility of 
experience, that is, of the subject of knowledge. 
All other possible ways of such a demarcation 
turn out to be arbitrary and transient, not having 
any existential foundation. Since the era of the 
“end of metaphysics” doubts the possibility 
of the universal metaphysics for demarcation 
of philosophy and theology, one is left with 
a question as to whether the transcendental 
principle remains valid in order to be placed 
in the foundation of such a demarcation. If the 
latter is impossible for events of communion 
and as well as for some phenomena in modern 
natural sciences, anthropology and the human 
sciences, then the transcendental argument for 
delimiting and making a distinction between 
science, philosophy and theology turns out to 
be impotent and philosophy is challenged by 
the necessity of developing new methods for 
dealing with situations when human knowledge 
and experience encounter the infinite and 
fundamentally impossible.
Coming back to the purpose of our 
discussion of establishing the difference in the 
modus of the given in the natural sciences and 
theology (answering as well in passim as to why 
one needs physics for theology) we proposed 
a metaphysical and transcendental argument 
that all givens of consciousness and experience 
of the Divine depend on the difference in the 
underlying ontology in the sciences (physical 
substance and biological formations) versus 
ontology of events, that is modi of phenomenality 
following from structures of subjectivity, adapted 
to the material environment. By so doing we 
have implicitly established delimiters between 
science and theology pointing out that in spite 
of the explicitly ontic features of theological 
knowledge, as distinct from the ontologically 
rooted natural sciences, the very ontic needs to 
have an ontological basis (as a corporeal basis 
of a subject), whereas the ontological condition 
must be elucidated through the structural path 
of its constitution by subjectivity (that cannot 
be accounted on the level of ontology). Thus the 
strict demarcation between science and theology 
on the basis of the opposition between ontic and 
ontological can hardy be achieved contributing to 
the argument that a naïve positing of experience 
of the Divine outside the material conditions of 
the possibility of this expression represents de 
facto faith without reason, whose existential and 
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soteriological meaning remains obscure, whereas 
any physical reductionism in the constitution of 
humanity also fails without, de facto, an appeal 
to theology of human creation. However, the use 
of metaphysical and transcendental arguments in 
justification of theology encounters a difficulty 
consisting in the fact that the very dialogue 
between science and theology does not represent 
any metaphysical or transcendental necessity 
but has features of events of life pertaining to 
human reason and free will that cannot be as 
such deduced on the grounds of causality to any 
ontology. Here one deals with such event-like 
phenomena that relate to life’s self-affectivity, so 
that their interpretation demands new philosophy 
that deals first of all with the phenomenon of man 
understood as an event of life, the phenomenon 
that has a “meta-ontological” status, blessing 
and justifying de facto the possibility of the 
philosophical as well as scientific knowledge of 
the world. 
How to make a theological distinction  
in the modi of the given in the natural  
sciences and theology?
If in the previous section we have established 
that theology, unlike philosophy and the sciences, 
deals with event-like phenomena denying 
ontology to the impossible and thus exceeding 
the capacity of transcendental delimiters, then 
the question arises: how is theology possible at 
all? To discuss this issue one inevitably enters 
the realms of theological anthropology since the 
answer to this question ultimately refers to the 
reality of the human. The Patristic model differs 
from the modern, widely accepted understanding 
of the human person as a being endowed with 
a reasoning brain, consciousness, will, and 
emotions. The early Fathers considered the 
human person not only in the light of the dualism 
between body and discursive reason (dianoia, or 
intellect in its contemporary sense, the mind). 
They made a subtle distinction between dianoia 
and nous, in which the latter stands for the faculty 
of apprehending truth, which is superior to 
discursive reason. Nous can be broadly explained 
in modern language as spiritual insight or as 
spiritual intellect where logic cannot be used.
Dianoia (reason, mind) functions as the 
discursive, conceptualizing, logical faculty 
in man; it employs such particular cognitive 
operations as dissection, analysis, measurement, 
and the use of mathematics. The function 
of dianoia is to collect information about 
phenomena in the phenomenality of objects. The 
limits of dianoia are outlined by its ability to 
draw conclusions (by syllogistic deduction) and 
to formulate concepts (by induction). Dianoia is 
similar to object-orientated thinking, which by 
definition aims to obtain knowledge of an object, 
posed in thought as an external object, by means 
of the logical formulas “A is B” or “A is not B.”
It has been clear, since the early Fathers, that 
dianoia can be applied only to things that allow 
rational thinking, that is, to things of the created 
world. Maximus the Confessor comments thus: 
“Created beings are termed intelligible [that 
is, they can be grasped by the reason (dianoia)] 
because each of them has an origin that can be 
known rationally [that is, discursively]. But God 
cannot be termed intelligible, while from our 
apprehension of intelligible beings we can do 
no more than believe that He exists.”6 Rational 
thinking (that is, dianoia) cannot be used in 
theologia, in the immediate vision and experience 
of God. Knowledge based on the dianoia does not 
imply any direct apprehension or perception of 
the inner essences or principles of created beings, 
still less of divine truth itself. The apprehension 
in the latter sense is made possible only by nous 
and is beyond the scope of reason.
In contradistinction to dianoia, the nous 
works by direct apprehension. Its subject matter is 
not simply outside itself. It does not reason from 
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premises to conclusions by strict logical steps; rather, 
it apprehends the truth through a kind of inner vision 
through which he knows God or the inner essences 
or principles of created things by means of direct 
apprehension or spiritual perception. According to 
Maximus the Confessor: “The intellect [nous] is the 
organ of wisdom, the intelligence that of spiritual 
knowledge.”7 “It possesses the capacity for a union 
that transcends its nature and that unites it with 
what is beyond its natural scope. It is through this 
union that divine realities are apprehended, not by 
means of our own natural capacities, but by virtue 
of the fact that we entirely transcend ourselves and 
belong entirely to God.”8
This aspect of transcendence exercised 
by nous closely resembles that which could be 
simply called faith. One can conjecture that nous 
provides conditions for faith to be intentional: 
one who wants to find God through reason can 
do it, theoretically speaking, by developing 
one’s nous. At the same time, it is clear that the 
exercise of rational faculties in order to develop 
nous requires one, in a sense, to deny the rational 
faculties that one starts with. Faith sometimes is 
juxtaposed with knowledge. In our context, this 
juxtaposition means one of nous with dianoia.
The nous thus provides a foundation for 
reason to infer from the created things to the 
existence of God, that is to experience the 
foundation of all things in their otherness (that 
they are created). This inference constitutes faith 
in existence of God and is granted to a believer 
by God himself: “Faith is true knowledge, 
the principles of which are beyond rational 
demonstration; for faith makes real for us things 
beyond intellect [mind] and reason (cf. Heb 11:1).”9 
Faith, whose organ is nous, allows us to transcend 
general conditions of knowledge imposed by 
mind and reason with respect to things of this age 
and “see” not only the intelligible realities but 
also the underlying principles of existence of all 
things leading to God.
So how is theologia possible? The answer 
so far is that theologia as experience of God is 
possible because humans have the faculty of 
nous, which allows them in principle to have 
experience of God, that is, to be in communion 
with God. It is clear for any careful reader that 
the logic of our argument is based, in fact, on the 
acceptance of the Christian Patristic model of 
human being, being a part of Orthodox theology. 
It is important also to realize that the affirmation 
that nous makes theologia possible assumes, in 
fact, not only that this faculty is present in human 
composite but also that nous is related to the 
essence of the human person, to that individual, 
distinct link that a person has with God and 
which makes one person different from another. 
This clearly indicates that there is something in 
nous that transcends the natural aspects of the 
human person (the body and soul). In Patristic 
thought, body and soul constituted the natural 
composition, which is held in human hypostasis. 
St. Maximus compares human composite with 
Christ. The unity of body and soul in Christ is 
purely hypostatic (that is, non-natural), whereas 
in humans the same unity is not only hypostatic 
but also natural.10 It is exactly this unity that, 
according to Maximus the Confessor, constitutes 
a person. Realizing one’s potential toward full 
existence makes a challenge for nous; if humans 
succeed in this – that is, if they manage to 
establish ultimate personhood their nous will fit 
for theologia, for the mystical contemplation of 
God to the extent that is possible for humans.11
Thus philosophy as a modus of consciousness 
related to the faculty of dianoia can deal only 
with things of nature. God exceeds its capacity 
and thus is inaccessible to dianoia. However, 
theologians (in contradistinction to philosophers) 
know about the defect of nature and of the natural 
in man (related to the Fall) and recognise the 
necessity of transfiguration of nature, that is its 
perfection in the image of the supernatural. In 
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other words, if philosophy and science interpret 
beings only in the measure they see in them the 
natural, for theology remains that which either 
does not possess nature at all or exceeds the limits 
of the latter. Here the problem arises: how the 
natural man can achieve the Divine grace in the 
vision of God, that is transcend its own natural 
faculties, that is to employ that which is present in 
him latently, that is nous. The problem is whether 
the natural formation can develop a desire to 
access something which cannot be achieved in 
the limits of this nature. The answer is “yes”, 
man can develop such a desire, first of all when 
he questions his own essence. Indeed, one cannot 
know his essence in a metaphysical sense for, 
according to theological definitions, man must 
remain undefinable as a carrier in its essence and 
hypostasis of the image of the undefinable God12 
(undefinablity of the essence of God deprives 
man of the essence which can be defined). It is 
exactly this that inspires man for the acquisition 
of grace as the supernatural Good in order to try 
to understand the sense of himself. Thus dianoia 
(dealing with knowable aspects of man’s physical 
existence) and nous (as having an insight on the 
insufficiency of dianoia’s knowledge of man) 
cannot be separated in a real man, both of them 
function in parallel although the advance of one 
with respect to another depends on a particular 
personality. It follows from this observation that 
the strict separation of the cognitive faculties 
onto a philosophical and theological modi 
cannot be applied to man without distorting the 
fundamental feature of the human condition, 
namely the unknowability of man by himself.
The difference between the natural (the 
realm of dianoia) and super- or trans-natural (the 
realm of nous) which one could, by the way of 
a historical analogy, apply for the demarcation 
of science, philosophy and theology, fails 
irrevocably in the case of a human being that by 
the fact of its existence, represents a synthesis 
of the natural and supernatural. The natural 
dimension in man, in corporeal setting in being, 
cannot be detached from his consciousness that 
cannot be reduced to the natural on the basis of 
the laws of causality (which are necessary for 
the human condition, but not sufficient), that 
consciousness which as a distinctive feature 
of his definition as made in the image of God, 
cannot be explained by man himself. It is man 
(as a generalised notion of humanity) that forms 
the major concern and subject matter of theology 
where the natural and supernatural cannot be 
clearly separated and detached from each other.
The impossibility of knowing the essence of 
man shows that a possible ontological response 
(referring to the substance of the world of which 
man is made) to the question as to why theology 
needs cosmology, is not sufficient, for the human 
phenomenon exceeds the boundaries of the 
scientific and philosophical and needs a super-
natural (theological) elucidation. Correspondingly 
the contingent facticity of physics and cosmology, 
as accounting for the foundation of the natural 
condition of man, cannot receive explanation 
from themselves in the same manner as the 
essential aspects of the human condition cannot 
account for themselves. Since the very fact of the 
human existence as exceeding its own naturalness 
and possessing its own hypostasis cannot be 
accounted through cosmological theories, this 
fact remains beyond the circle of causality 
pertaining to the world’s ontology, that is man 
deals with himself as an event saturated with the 
intuition of communion with the source of life. 
Thus cosmology needs theology to “justify” the 
very possibility of cosmology as a modus of the 
human existence. However, here, the implied 
argument is not ontological but appealing to the 
event-like phenomenon of a particular human 
life, the phenomenon which saturates intuition 
to such an extent, that it cannot be accounted 
on the grounds of causality and within the 
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limits of the transcendental cognitive faculties. 
This event-like phenomenon has an extensive 
content, starting from the actual event of birth 
and finishing by particularities of life unfolding 
into the future, that which has been given as 
a gift of life at the moment of birth. It is not 
difficult to see that the modus of the given in the 
phenomenon of man as a centre of disclosure and 
manifestation of the relations between the world 
and God turns our to be fundamentally different 
in comparison with science and philosophy: the 
essence and structure of the outer reality (as the 
givens in the representation of consciousness) 
receives its “meta-ontological” justification in 
inaugural (opening) events such as an event 
of human life, humankind-event, an event of 
creation (birth) of man13 whose phenomenality 
is not that of objects studied by the sciences. 
Cosmology needs theology in order to realise that 
the approach to seeing the universe as a physical 
object, typical for cosmology, is based in an event 
of life of a hypostatic human being, the event 
which cannot be subjected to a purely ontological 
description, but receiving its interpretation from 
theology as that understanding where man was 
brought into existence by the will of the invisible 
origin. In this case cosmology as a consequence 
of the event of life receives its justification 
from theology of communion dealing with the 
inaugural (opening) events, first of all with the 
event of birth. The image of the world is built in 
the conditions of the presence of the divine image 
in man in these inaugural events. However this 
image remains limited and unaccomplished since 
the sense of divine image in man remains hidden 
and unknowable for man himself. This happens, 
theologically speaking, because the divine image 
in man remains only an image and not likeness, 
lost after the Fall. The very knowledge of the 
world as an adaptation and arrangement of man’s 
place in creation forms a constitutive element of 
that which named the Fall.14
Thus the undefinability of man and his 
unknowability by himself as having a theological 
interpretation forms the precondition for the 
actual limited knowability of the world (this 
is not a transcendental condition related to the 
embodied human faculties). This implies that 
cosmology follows the same apophatic pattern of 
explanation which is typical for the theological 
anthropology of the divine image.15 The difference 
in the status of phenomenality of “things” in 
cosmology and theology amounts first of all to the 
limited scope of cosmology and unknowability of 
the universe understood as creation (and not as 
a fragment of the physically observed cosmos), 
for the sphere of its phenomenality (linked to 
the astronomical objects and inferred theoretical 
constructs) does not take into account the event-
like essence of man: knowledge of the world 
unfolds as if consciousness of this world exist 
without any recourse to the event of coming into 
existence of corporeal persons. By neglecting the 
foundation of knowledge in events of the human 
existence cosmology deprives itself of realising 
that the structure of the given in cosmology is 
ultimately determined by the present facticity of 
consciousness having sense of revelation for man 
himself, theologically treated as the revelation of 
God. In such a vision the fact of life, as well as 
knowledge in philosophy and science (as modi 
operandi of life) are seen as outcomes of the 
Revelation understood as the given in the event-
like phenomenality, incorporating all specific 
forms of philosophical and scientific knowledge 
(although the very givens of Revelation are not 
accessible in a non-mediated form, that is without 
a special procedure of their appropriation).
One may focus a bit on the latter point 
by making a historical reference to what was 
implied in mediation between the givens 
of Revelation and knowledge, theology and 
philosophy. Theology proposed some special 
epistemological conditions of justification and 
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appropriation of the phenomena of communion 
by extending rationality towards such existential 
notions as faith and love. Clement of Alexandria, 
for example, declares that knowledge is 
possible only because of faith and that faith is a 
condition for knowledge of any kind. Conversely, 
knowledge helps make affirmations of faith 
demonstrable and thus, according to Clement, 
more scientific. The faith that is true knowledge 
of revelation becomes a more scientific faith 
when supported by philosophy, and in this way 
it becomes gnosis.16 Clement emphasizes that to 
enable faith to overcome the lack of necessity 
and rigor of mere opinion, one must appeal 
to the methods used in the sciences. Since 
knowledge is based on demonstration emerging 
from the first principles that cannot themselves 
be demonstrated, knowledge itself cannot be 
demonstrated. This in turn implies that the very 
possibility of knowledge requires the acceptance 
of first principles, that is faith in them (to use 
scientific methods for the study of the world one 
should believe in the possibility of these methods, 
that is to believe in man as an empirical and 
unknowable fact of the Divine Revelation). In 
this way, knowledge depends on something that 
is not knowledge; this is faith: “For knowledge is 
a state of mind that results from demonstration; 
but faith is a grace which from what is 
indemonstrable conducts to what is universal and 
simple, something that is neither with matter, nor 
matter, nor under matter”.17 It is faith, therefore, 
that allows one to formulate the first principles in 
a proper way and to perceive things that are not 
seen in the course of demonstrable knowledge. 
Demonstration then follows after faith, but not 
the other way around. Then a demonstration 
based on reasoned knowledge produces faith in 
those who wish to learn of God (and man) by 
examining the Scriptures. Clement calls this 
faith that is supported by philosophical methods 
(that is inclusion of events of communion into 
the philosophical sphere) a considered faith (that 
is, a gnosis), and according to Clement, it forms 
the subject matter of theology. If existential faith 
is in the foundation of any knowledge, this faith 
concerns man as having access to knowledge of 
God and the world. Faith (as belief distinct from 
certainty of knowledge) becomes in this case an 
epistemological equivalent of the undefinability 
and unknowability of man by himself that, being 
empirical facts, require their acceptance as a 
particular but inaugural Revelation of God to 
man.
Another example of how the givens of 
Revelation are appropriated in knowledge can be 
found in St. Augustine who promoted a view that 
from the very beginning Christianity doubted 
any comparison with ancient religions (theologia 
civilis and theologia fabulosa), making possible 
its encounter only with theologia naturalis, that 
makes an effort of studying the Divine from the 
movement of the heavenly bodies. Augustine 
insists on the only adequate use of the term 
theologia for Christian faith as true knowledge 
of the Divine. Since one speaks of truth “…
comparison must be made with philosophy 
(cum philosophis est habenda conlatio)”. Thus 
philosophy must deal with faith, for, as Augustine 
concludes “a true philosopher is the lover God 
(verus philosophus est amator Dei).”18 Love for 
God that is laid by Augustine in the foundation 
of true theology presupposes communion as an 
empirical source of any proposition and rational 
thinking about God. Philosophy as a rational 
“response” to Revelation must acquire a shape 
which is adjusted to the appropriation of those 
phenomena from the realm of revelation which 
a-priori do not fit the schemes of metaphysica 
generalis and transcendental epistemology.
In both cases, in the Greek East and 
Latin West, the sense of theology implied the 
acceptance of principles of the immediacy of 
communion, whose givenness in experiential 
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and empirical knowledge of God was not 
immediately evident and verified, universally 
inaccessible to all, and following from the 
mysterious aposteriori remaining real and true in 
its given facticity. Speaking of communion one 
implies first of all events of relationship between 
God and the world, creation of the world, the 
Incarnation of God in flesh, Resurrection and 
other personal events of saints and ascetics, all 
given in the unforeseeable experience in the sense 
absolutely impossible from the point of view of 
their scientific-like explanation in the limits of 
metaphysics as if one could determine beforehand 
the anticipating horizon for these events. In 
the same vein one cannot define apriori that 
transcendental subject whose cognitive faculties 
would correspond to the possibility of placing the 
events of communion (as unrepeatable, devoid 
of their ontological definition and propensity 
of their objective representation) in the limits 
of experience. Communion allows one to open 
a possibility of a new type of understanding 
of inaccessible and metaphysically impossible 
phenomena by extending the limits of rationality 
as such. If human rationality is understood 
as a natural reaction of the understanding to 
form a response to the events of communion, 
it is the task of philosophy to comprehend how 
the new givens of these events do fit into the 
framework of rationality. It is the main challenge 
to philosophy from theology of communion 
and, correspondingly, to the dialogue of 
theology with the rationalism of scientific 
understanding. Namely, philosophy must extend 
by appropriating, through the non-metaphysical 
philosophising, theological experience and, as a 
result, to undertake a philosophical demarcation 
between scientific experience and experience 
of communion. How does rationality succeed 
in appropriating experience of communion and 
how do its paths differ from rationality’s modus 
operandi in the sciences?
In order to recognise that theology as such 
as well as its relationship with science lead 
necessarily to taking into account the events 
of communion as new, but truly givens which 
require an epistemological qualification, one first 
needs to recognise the fact of their existence, their 
reality and unavoidable origin in the event of life 
in general. For a naturalistically oriented scientist 
any link between experience of living (with its 
intrinsic codification of the event of creation 
of the whole world (in which the possibility of 
the corporeal existence is granted)), the event 
of the Incarnation of the Word of God (in order 
knowledge of the universe to be possible in the 
archetype of the Divine image), the very moral 
teaching of Christ (for the civilisation to escape 
chaos and destruction), the Resurrection (that 
gives hope to man and determines the goals of 
knowledge), all these events involving a new type 
of givenness do not possess any certainty and 
validity. From the point of view of such a scientist 
the acceptance of the abovementioned events (and 
similar to them) in the scope of epistemologically 
extended rationality implies an element of 
faith (that is an opinion or judgement), so that 
the incorporation such events in the scope of 
rationality has sense only for believers. However, 
in this distinction between faith and non-faith 
(believing or not believing, between doxa and 
episteme) there is an element of metaphysical 
thinking present implying the distinction between 
faith and knowledge on the ontological level and 
within the transcendental setting. But, as we have 
already stated, these criteria of distinction cannot 
be applied to man himself, who is the source and 
origin of such a distinction, so that by denying 
or abandoning an aspect of faith in respect to 
knowledge of man, one means the intentional 
denial of his unknowability by himself, that is 
the distortion in representation of the sense of the 
human condition and thus the distortion of truth 
in general. It follows from here that the primary 
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given of events of communion which requires a 
rational reaction and epistemological qualification 
is the givenness of man to himself, that is the 
mysteriousness of life as self-affectivity, as life 
from Life, that which is in the foundation of man’s 
faith in reality of his own life.
Communion, unlike mundane wisdom, 
happens on the initiative of that who is beyond any 
metaphysical and transcendental conditionality of 
that wisdom in man. It is the transcendent (event-
like) character of communion that makes possible 
to maintain a clear-cut distinction between that 
which is disclosed in revelation and that which is 
constituted as an object of knowledge. By quoting 
a fragment from an Epistle to Hebrews 4:12, “The 
word of God is alive and active. It cuts more keenly 
that any two-edged sword, piercing so deeply that 
it divides soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it 
discriminates among the purpose and thoughts of 
the heart”, one can make a conclusion that it is 
the Word of God (as the Logos, that is reason), 
that is capable to discriminate in knowledge that 
which belongs to man and that which originates 
in God, that is that which is revealed. One can 
object again by saying that this criterion implies 
faith and hence aims at believers, so that the 
distinction between human knowledge of the 
world and thinking of God implies that there is 
something given in communion that (depending 
of a particular person) is either accepted or not in 
face of the Word of God, that is reason (Logos), 
that is something enters or not in the realm of 
the experienced or thought. If that which is 
given in communion is accepted, then theology 
receives its justification from that these givens 
are included in the sphere of phenomena, in its 
rights the same as all other givens, but requiring 
a special epistemological justification within the 
extended rationality. If, alternatively, the givens 
of communion are not included in the sphere 
of phenomena, they remain inarticulate and 
metaphysically impossible. 
As we have seen above faith was that 
condition of acceptance of the givens of 
communion into the sphere of phenomena, 
which could be appropriated on the grounds of 
rationality extended through this faith. Faith,  
being a condition for accepting the givens of 
communion, being one of the virtues, according 
to (Cor. 1:13) is inseparable from hope and love, 
where love is supreme and “remaining to the end.” 
This is the reason why the acceptance of the givens 
of communion implies that that which is received 
and That Who gives is not just an “object” of 
contemplation, but first of all the “object” of love 
as love for truth. In communion love changes the 
modalities of knowledge, that is epistemological 
criteria of reception of the givens in communion 
as the manifestation of love to truth. According 
to Augustine love is the condition that what is 
being known is true: “the only way to truth is 
by love”19. In other words, truth is rooted in love 
as its epistemological condition, not because 
truth cannot be fully disclosed without love, but 
because it is love itself that is the ultimate and 
only foundation for the possibility of seeing and 
grasping truth.20 Pascal expressed differently 
a similar thought: “ ..au lieu qu’en parlant de 
chose humaines on dit qu’il faut les connaître 
avant que de les aimer…., les saints au contraire 
dissent en parlant des choses divine qu’il faut les 
aimer pour les connaître, et qu’on n’entre dans 
la vérité que par la charité…” (“With respect 
to human things it is said that it is necessary to 
know them in order to love,… the saints, on the 
contrary, say, of divine things, that they must be 
loved in order to be known and that truth (vérité) 
is manifested only through love (charité)”) 
(Pascal 2001: 8). Love, however is not that which 
is simply commensurable with experience of 
mundane reality. It demands one to overcome the 
sense of despair and futility of human existence, 
which was articulated by Pascal in his Pensées, 
and to acquire love to God: “Qu’il y a loin de la 
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connasaince de Dieu à l’aimer” (“What a great 
distance between knowledge of God and love to 
him”) (Pascal 1962: 161). It is only this love can 
guarantee an access to the “great reason”, for it is 
love given to us in the revelation of the Word, that 
is the Logos, which reveals itself as logos, that is 
as rationality which makes it possible to approach 
the phenomena which are more close and more 
intrinsic to us, those which are experienced by 
the spirit-bearing human flesh and exceed the 
capacity of being grasped by discursive thinking. 
Here one means first of all knowing of human 
person by himself including the facticity of its 
all-encompassing consciousness manifesting life. 
Then one can speak of knowledge of the universe 
as a whole as creation being “coincident” with 
life and every person through an instantaneous 
intellectual synthesis. One can overcome the 
feeling of non-attunement with the universe, 
one’s solitude in it and anxiety of non-sense of 
being, with the aid of that “great reason” which 
incorporates these mysteries into the scope of its 
givens whose reality and truth is guaranteed by 
love to life and its Creator. The “great reason” 
implies the mind of Christ-Logos, by whom and 
through whom the universe was created and for 
whom, after the Incarnation in flesh, the whole 
universe was intelligibly given in its fullness as 
an instant of the Divine love, and who remains 
the Lord of the worlds (Jn. 1:16).
Creation of the universe manifests the perfect 
love, that is the unconditional supremacy of love in 
relation to being: God created the universe out of 
his love and does not expect its recognition from 
the created, for God is above and beyond of that 
which he created. Knowledge of the universe as 
creation implies the hidden knowledge of Divine 
love and not only that which was created. Thus the 
contemplation and understanding of the universe 
as the event coincident with the event of life, that is 
perception of the universe as given at the moment 
of beginning of life, requires to follow the same 
unconditional love with respect to life as such that 
was in God creating the world out of nothing. 
Christian love justifies the very possibility 
of true knowledge, for that who loves, that is, 
believes in God, everything is possible, including 
knowledge of truth. The loving human being has 
the same privilege which God has (Mark 10:27). 
Christian love makes possible the “impossible 
knowledge” of man by himself, although in a 
reduced form, as sensing of its own centrality in 
creation as the God-given ability to know oneself 
through knowledge of God. To know truly one 
should be known by God and for this one must 
love God (1 Cor. 8:3). To know oneself truly 
and to know the universe truly means to have 
knowledge not by one’s own thought, but by the 
thought of Him, who discloses himself only to 
those who love him. Knowledge of the universe 
as self-knowledge in order to be true requires 
the acquisition, as its archetype, the “mind of 
God” through love to him. But this is not what 
is given to humanity in its natural propensity. To 
know through love and to know through God’s 
“mind and eyes” requires one to exercise one’s 
will. Christian love means the ability to approach 
things and to see in them the divine presence 
contrary to their compelling empirical evidence, 
that is to see that presence which can only be 
manifested to humanity as a carrier of free will 
and love. To know things through love and will 
means not their passive contemplation, but active 
participation in them, a sort of communion with 
them which allows one to get access to an otherwise 
inconceivable transcendence of other creatures 
and essences. Here love takes responsibility 
for that which is affirmed in philosophy and 
science because it Christologically reinstates the 
definition of philosophy, and hence the sciences, 
to their proper sense as “love of wisdom” or 
“love of truth” leading them beyond their 
metaphysical limitations and appealing to a new 
epistemological exploration of those phenomena 
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that are possible contrary to their seeming 
metaphysical impossibility and exceeding the 
limits of their transcendental definitions. Without 
love, human reason is limited in interpreting 
the world, by transforming it into objects of 
possession and hence dealing only with their 
deficient phenomenality.
Christian love aspires for such a metanoia 
in the state of the human mind that the created 
world appears to it as it is contemplated through 
the “eyes” of the Logos through whom and by 
whom all is. It is because of this metanoia that 
in spite of scientific persuasions on insignificance 
of our place in the universe to the extent that 
one could detest life because of its absurdity and 
ontological homelessness, that love for the truth 
of life itself (as an entrance into the mysterious 
and extraordinary state of being alive) gives 
one the power of recognising in man a glimpse 
of truth of its origin from Life, that is not seen 
at the empirical level and is metaphysically 
inexpressible. One means Life that “was life, 
and that life was the light of mankind” that was 
in the Word that was in the beginning; and “the 
light shines in the darkness, and the darkness 
has never mastered it” (John 1: 1–5). Man in 
his present condition cannot “see” this light not 
because this light is “weak” and “dim” so that 
there is the lack of its phenomenality to man, but, 
on the contrary, because this light of life is given 
to man in an absolute excess by “overexposing”, 
that is saturating intuition to such an extent that 
the source of life as its origin becomes invisible. 
Unknowability of man by himself originates 
in his presence in front of such an excess of 
life that blocks the possibility of any ultimate 
comprehension of man by himself in categories 
of understanding and by reason. Christian love 
is capable of leading man to the recognition 
and acceptance of the fact of the unconditional 
givenness of life as a gift originating in Life in 
the Word.
By analysing special epistemological 
conditions for justification of phenomena of 
communion (where the first one is the revelation 
of life to man), the conditions which explicate 
the extended rationality, one can infer that the 
ambivalence of the human place in creation forms 
the basis of the difference between theology and 
science, so that the very problem of relation 
and mediation between theology and science 
manifests the inevitability of this ambivalence in 
the core of the human condition. 
Self-affectivity of life as an inaugural 
saturated phenomenon and the ultimate 
foundation of the dialogue between  
science and theology
The logic of our discussion brought us 
to the conclusion that the difference between 
science and theology can be qualified as a 
different philosophical reflection upon that 
which can be presented in phenomenality of 
objects on the one hand, and of the event-like 
phenomena whose phenomenality exceeds the 
boundaries of metaphysical definitions grounded 
in substantiality, causality, foreseeability, in the 
opposition of the possible and impossible. If such 
a distinction and difference of phenomenality 
were absolute no dialogue between science and 
theology would seem to be possible at all. This 
remains true in what concerns such singular 
events of communion as the Incarnation, 
Resurrection and Ascension, the hypostatic 
descent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles, etc. 
Despite the ongoing infinite historical, linguistic 
and theological hermeneutics of these events, they 
remain fundamentally irreducible to any sort of 
the worldly causality. However, in order for these 
events to be articulated rationally in response to 
their transcendent “appeal”, one needs a receptible 
being, that is man. Generalising, one needs life 
which is “light to men”. This life, proceeding 
from the Word, appears to man dualistically: 
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one the one hand as life in the body in rubrics 
of space and time, when man is positioned as an 
object in terms of scales of the universe, and, 
on the other hand, as an inexpressible mystery 
of conscious existence from which the whole 
universe is articulated. Classical philosophy 
detected this ambivalence in the position of 
humanity by numerous ways and named it the 
“paradox of human subjectivity in the world”.21 
This paradox gives an example of the twofold 
interpretation of one and the same phenomenon 
of man: on the one hand, man appears in the 
phenomenality of objects as one physical object 
among the many; on the other hand, he is present 
as articulating consciousness in which the whole 
universe in totality of its space and time is 
brought to its recapitulation through the instant 
intellectual synthesis in the event of life of this 
consciousness. In other words, the phenomenality 
of man receives a different status depending 
on interpretation, that is on hermeneutics, thus 
showing that there is no phenomenal gulf between 
how he is presented in consciousness in the first 
and second case. One can speak of a variation in 
the modus of phenomenality as a consequence 
of the hermeneutic variation. A historical and 
philosophical pointer towards this link can be 
found in “Critique of Practical Reason” where 
Kant speculates as to how, in the case of man, 
to reconcile the seeming contradiction between 
human freedom and the mechanism of nature, 
to which man is subordinated because of his 
corporeal condition. He writes: “We must 
remember what was said in the ‘Critique of Pure 
Reason’, or what follows therefrom: that the 
necessity of nature, which cannot co-exist with 
the freedom of the subject, appertains only to 
the attributes of the thing that is subject to time-
conditions, consequently only to those of the 
acting subject as a phenomenon… But the very 
same subject being on the other side conscious of 
himself as a thing in himself, …regards himself 
as only determinable by laws which he gives 
himself through reason; and in this his existence 
nothing is antecedent to the determination of 
his will, …. the whole series of his existence as 
a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his 
supersensible existence nothing but the result 
…of his causality as a noumenon” (Kant, 1959 
[229]: 191). In other words, causality and other 
categories determine necessarily only the natural 
mechanism responsible for the actions of subjects 
as phenomena, but are not applicable to them as 
things in themselves. Moral freedom and natural 
necessity are harmonised in one and the same 
“object”, that is man, by means of variation of 
the modus of phenomenality, the variation which 
became possible because of the hermeneutical 
variation in one and the same “object”, that is 
man, as phenomenon and noumenon.
The entry of hermeneutics into the criterion 
of distinction between the modi of phenomenality 
(for example, between the phenomenality of 
objects (in science) and phenomenality of events 
(in theology)) points to that the difference 
in “view” of one and the same phenomenon 
originates in man, namely in variation of his 
intuition. For example, the transition from a 
perception of the universe as a physical spatio-
temporal object to its contemplation as the event 
coincident with human life corresponds to the 
transition from the phenomenon of the universe 
with poor intuition to the universe as a saturated 
phenomenon with an excess of intuition.22 
Then one can conjecture that the difference 
in interpretation of phenomena on the basis of 
scientific rationality and extended rationality of 
theology has its origin in man himself so that 
the difference between the scientific world-view 
and world’s perception in the context of religious 
experience is linked to that intrinsic variability 
and flexibility of the human cognitive faculties 
from which this difference and possible forms 
of its explication (either conflict or consonance) 
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arise. The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
world gives an example of ineluctable dichotomy 
in representation of the living experience of 
the world: namely its objective representation 
(man as a part of the universe) and its event-
like interpretation (when the whole universe 
is articulated in human consciousness). The 
mystery of this dichotomy (that is an ambivalent 
appearance of man to himself) remains and, 
being irrevocable in any knowledge of being, 
becomes a characteristic element of the 
human condition. Since, as we have discussed 
previously, one cannot produce a metaphysical 
“basis” for the phenomenon of man, the sense 
of the abovementioned dichotomy in perception 
of the human place in the universe remains also 
metaphysically inexplicable, so that the split 
in the scientific and theological perception of 
reality manifests the difference in the modi of 
phenomenality. The problem of relation between 
science and theology, seen in the perspective 
of history, sociology and even anthropology, 
becomes an inalienable characteristics of man 
and his unknowability by himself. One concludes 
then that any hope for establishing of such a 
dialogue between science and theology that could 
reconcile science and theology in a sort of unity, 
is existentially futile.23
Thus one needs to state that the major 
driving aspect of all discussions on science and 
theology is the incomprehensible facticity of 
man, his life and life as such. Both science and 
theology (together with philosophy) receive their 
ultimate foundation in events of life, originating 
from life as such. But since, in coherence with 
our previous argument, one cannot establish an 
ontological (metaphysical) foundation for the 
phenomenon of life, one cannot consider life on 
the same level with the rest of reality of nature, 
for life transcends the capacity of being presented 
in the phenomenality of objects by manifesting 
itself in the event of its sheer facticity as the 
possibility of all further phenomenalisations. 
The world thus becomes grasped and hence 
phenomenalised within the life-event horizon. 
The facticity of life and man that are treated 
theologically as the willing of the Word and the 
Spirit to create man in the image of the Holy 
Trinity (being de facto the givens of theology of 
communion), challenge philosophy by forcing it 
to develop the hermeneutics and phenomenology 
of that which is not apparent, that is of that which 
does not show itself, but is in the foundation of 
distinction between that which is alive (man) 
and which is not. Such a philosophy will have to 
rationally appropriate experience of communion 
as the faculty of thought and speech, following 
an ideal of freedom from slavery to nature and 
society, the unconditional acceptance of love as 
an ultimate principle of communion and being.
The invisible and indemonstrable 
phenomenon of life as such is explicated 
dramatically in the problem of man’s birth, treated 
phenomenologically. By referring the reader to 
details on this subject elsewhere (Romano, 1998: 
95-112), (Marion, 2003b: 87-105), (Marion, 
2010: 291-99), we just would like to point out 
that the phenomenological inaccessibility 
to the event of birth as a hidden mystery of 
life in general, being implicitly present in all 
discussions on science and theology, explicates 
itself indirectly in both, historically and literary 
narrated events of Christian history, such a the 
Incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus Christ, 
as well as in scientific narrative of the beginning 
of the universe or of the inaugural event of the 
biological evolution. Then, since according 
to modern scientific world-view the whole 
physical world had its origin in the singular 
event in the past of the universe (the event 
whose contingent facticity is not elucidated by 
science itself), science ultimately appeals to the 
same intuition of “beginning” which pertains 
to the unknowability of man by himself, that 
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unknowability which constitutes the initial 
and final point in the problem of science and 
theology. However, as in phenomenology of 
birth, where birth is not a point of “arrival” 
of life to somewhere, but a point of departure 
(for life to come into being it must arrive from 
life in general) the coming of the universe into 
being is not simply “birth” of the dead physical 
world from something that either logically or 
temporally preceded it, but rather represents the 
origin of a certain phenomenality of the world as 
a result of coming into existence of life. It is this 
that forms the beginning of theology understood 
not as “speculations of the human mind or a 
result of the critical study, but as a revelation of 
that being to which man was introduced by the 
operation of the Holy Spirit” (Sakharov, 1999: 
171). It is the theology of the living presence 
of God rehabilitating the human subject, 
“sustaining him in his personal relations with 
God and with his fellow creatures” (Torrance, 
1997b: 188). In theological activity as a modus 
of life “human reason finds itself posited with a 
given reality that is not a dumb or inert object 
of knowledge but the Holy Spirit speaking the 
Word of God and in that Word presenting the 
very Being of God as the creative source and 
objective ground of our knowledge of Him” 
(Torrance, 1997b: 182).
If thus the problem of origin of human life 
constitutes the core of the dialogue between 
theology and science, and this problem is 
theological by definition, it becomes clear that the 
relationship between science and theology cannot 
be “symmetric”, so that the very positioning of 
the relationship as a relation “between” science 
and theology represents a misunderstanding. The 
very possibility of science as a consequence of 
facticity of life constitutes a theological problem, 
for one must first of all pose a question on the 
possibility of the scientific description of the 
world and its representation in the phenomenality 
of objects. This ultimately leads to a question of 
“the Giver of life” (as “the Giver of science”), 
that is to true theology as the willing of the Holy 
Spirit. Here theology again challenges philosophy 
by initiating in a rational response to such a gift 
of life new understanding of phenomenality of 
that (the “Giver of life”) which is not transparent 
in rubrics of space and time.
The introduction of a pneumatological 
dimension into the discourse on science and 
theology must appear strange and irrelevant 
to scientists. If the reflection upon the logical 
structure of the world can at least touch upon 
the Christological problematic, for the Logos 
is present in the world in its intelligible laws 
and in consubstantiality between the universe 
as the body of the incarnate Christ, a reflection 
upon the Holy Spirit becomes much more 
problematic for the latter has never been 
present in the rubrics of space and time (apart 
from the event of Pentecost) despite the fact 
that He invisibly and inalienably was “present” 
behind the actualisation of the Incarnation in 
the physical world. It is because of this that 
it becomes a difficult task (even for theology) 
to detect the “presence” of the Spirit in the 
universe through his action upon history. 
The conceptual arrangement of theology thus 
needs philosophical methods dealing with the 
phenomenality of that which is not transparent, 
not shown, but that which implicitly present in 
the foundation of the very possibility of stating 
this non-transparency. One implies again a 
situation when the intuitive content of that 
which is not apparent exceeds the discursive 
capacity of its constitution, that is the encounter 
with the saturated phenomenon with the event-
like phenomenality. As it was expressed by 
T. Torrance, we encounter the Spirit “always 
as the Lord of implacable objectivity of His 
divine Being, objecting to our objectifying 
modes of thought and imparting Himself to 
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us in accordance with the modes of His own 
self-revealing through the Word” (Torrance 
1997[2], p. 173), that is by granting to us the 
proceeding from Him forms of His acquisition 
when true knowledge of things becomes 
knowledge not in the perspective of our nature, 
but from the disclosed self-affectivity of life as 
a pointer beyond its own limits. Paradoxically 
the Spirit points toward the impossibility of 
apprehending his presence in forms of thought 
and speech by exercising thus the possibility 
of grasping this impossibility. It is exactly this 
which places us under the constant bedazzling 
gaze of the Spirit that cannot be looked at. At 
the same time  the vision of the sense of those 
realities which man encounters in the event-like 
experience of the Divine, is achieved through 
the actions of the Holy Spirit upon history 
referring thus the content of our thought and 
speech pertaining to events of communion 
beyond their space-time context. The Spirit is 
that action and operation of God with respect 
to us which makes our concepts and cognitive 
forms open to that which is not apparent, but 
that lies in the foundation of our capacity of 
detecting and apprehending the events of 
communion.
Scientific activity and articulation of the 
universe also have in their modi operandi the 
implicit presence of the “giver of life” so that the 
philosophical explication of scientific theories as 
originating in the event of life will make possible 
to shed light on the pneumatological dimension 
of science as such, as well as the pneumatological 
dimension of the relation between science and 
theology of communion.
Instead of conclusion
The immediacy of the given in theology 
of communion entails that this theology cannot 
acquire a metaphysical form thus demanding the 
extension of philosophy beyond metaphysics. 
Philosophy has to incorporate into its scope the 
unobjectified phenomena and those aspects of 
human experience as birth, love to the other, the 
sensibility of one’ own flesh as consubstantial to 
the universe, the perception of events etc. These 
saturated phenomena by evading the rubrics of 
metaphysical description slip away from any 
scientific interpretation. However if one needs 
to relate (hermeneutically) these phenomena to 
the scientific ones one must at least attempt to 
apprehend them philosophically. Here theology 
provides an example for philosophy: the 
extension of the latter is possible if one includes 
into its scope the givens of communion. Such an 
extension of philosophy implying the refusal of 
the transcendental stance in knowledge brings 
it to a purely empirical sphere, by disregarding 
an initial question on what can be know and 
what cannot. By being empirical because of 
its dependence on the transcendent, theology 
precedes philosophy in that sense that it formulates 
new challenges for philosophy in the conditions 
when the metaphysical and transcendental matrix 
of thinking can not be employed anymore. It is in 
this sense that one can talk of the rationality of 
theology in a more complicated and efficacious 
sense than in philosophy. The same can be said 
of theology in its “dialogue” (mediation) with 
special scientific disciplines when the latter 
ambitiously pretend to know the universe and 
man as if they are ontologically rooted in some 
primordial substance of the world. Here theology 
gently points out that there is the transcendent 
foundation of the contingent facticity of the 
human world whose presence is “sensed” as an 
incredible unknowability of the world but not 
in the sense of a lack of knowledge or time to 
apprehend it, but in the sense of excess making 
every mysterious and extraordinary instant of 
human life a “bedazzling event” of presence of 
light of the Life from the Word, the Word Who 
was with God and Who was God.
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1 We use the terminology of the “given” (instead of “data”) in order from the beginning to underline the fact of presence 
of human subjectivity participation in detection, identification and articulation of phenomena in the form of “data”. The 
“given” is not a dispassionate and neutral imposing of the world or God upon a human subject, but the “gift” granted to 
human being as a part of Being in general in order to comprehend existence. 
2 (Heidegger, 1998a: 50). Com. with the test in Sein und Zeit, § 7, where Heidegger places theology on the same level with 
other disciplines dealing with the phenomena which are analysed by phenomenology (Heidegger, 1998b: 58). 
3 On a non-trivial and ambiguous sense of the tem Ereignis in later Heidegger distinct from the modern hermeneutics of 
events see (Romano, 2010: 20-27). 
4 See details on phenomenology of events in (Romano, 1998). A careful distinction of phenomenality of objects and phe-
nomenality of events is discussed in (Marion, 2010: 243-308).
5 See in this context (Bitbol et al., 2009). 
6 Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theologicorum ET: (Palmer, 1986: 115).
7 Maximus the Confessor Various Texts on Theology (3.33), in (Pamer, 1986: 215).
8 Maximus the Confessor Various Texts on Theology (5.68), in (Palmer, 1986: 276).
9 Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theologicorum 1.9. ET: (Palmer, 1986: 116). 
10 See (Thunberg, 1995: 105).
11 Maximus the Confessor, Cap. de Charitate, 4.50. ET: (Palmer, 1986: 106).
12 The fact that human nature is unknowable follows from its being an image and likeness of God, that is that one Who 
is unknowable. A classical excerpt from patristic texts is that one of Gregory of Nyssa: “Since the nature of our mind, 
which is the likeness of the Creator, evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the superior nature, figuring 
by its own unknowableness the incpomprehensible Nature” (Gregory of Nyssa, 1996: 397). See also an article (Marion, 
2005: 1-24), as well as a chapter from (Marion, 2010: 21-86).
13 “Le monde est en suspens dans l’evenement; il s’origine depuis toujours pour nous dans des evenements. inauguraux, a 
commencer par celui – insigne – de la naissance” (“The world is hanging in the event; it always originates for us in inau-
gural events, beginning with the most privileged one – our birth”) (Romano, 2010: 121).
14 See a detailed discussion of this statement in my book (Nesteruk, 2015: 73-81). 
15 C. Yannaras describes “as “apophatic” that linguistic semantics and attitude to cognition which refuses to exhaust the 
content of knowledge in its formulation, which refuses to exhaust the reality of things signified in the logic of signifiers 
(Yannaras, 2004: 84). In philosophy, for example, it originates from an epistemological argument pertaining to a sort of 
linguistic reformulation of the Kantian transcendentalism (which is typical for post-structuralism) that language condi-
tions the accessibility and intelligibility of reality. According to this view there is no access to the referent outside the lin-
guistic effect, but the linguistic effect is no the same as that referent it attempts but fails to capture. This situation entails, 
in analogy with theology, a variety of ways of making such a reference, where none of which can claim it exclusiveness and 
true accessibility to what the reference is made. The range of cognitive situations which fall under the scope of apophati-
cism can be found in works of J.-L. Marion under the name of “saturated phenomenon” (see (Marion, 2001)). Theology on 
its side affirms that any knowledge of God if it pretends to be real and true cannot escape the conditions of incongruence 
between human knowing and the reality of God. This incongruence is the immanent feature of any serious theologising: 
one cannot raise questions on the reality of God from some position which excludes a particular feature of the Divine man-
ifestation which is included in the very irreducibility of any speech about God to that reality which is predicated through 
this speech. See, for example, (Torrance, 1997: 52-55).
16 Clement of Alexandria, Stromaties 1.2, in A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (eds.), The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1962).
17 Stromaties 2.4.
18 Augustine of Hippo, Civitate Dei, VIII, 1. ET: (Betteson, 1980: 298).
19 St. Augustine (1994). Contra Faustum, Book 32, 18. ET: The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace, 
Ser. 1, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman Publishing Company), p. 581.
20 St. Augustine (2003). De Trinitate, 12, XI (16). ET: On the Trinity, ed. G.E. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), p. 94.
21 См. (Carr, 1999), (Nesteruk, 2015: 135-153).
22 Les phénomènes saturés – the so called “saturated phenomena” stand for the group of phenomena which cannot be rep-
resented in the phenomenality of objects, that is in rubrics of quantity, quality, relation and modality. The issue is that 
certain phenomena do not manifest themselves in the mode of objects and yet still do manifest themselves. These phe-
nomena undergo saturation by the excess of intuition over the concept or signification in them. Correspondingly the 
saturated phenomena cannot be constituted because they are saturated. Experience of the saturated phenomena cannot be 
predetermined by a transcendental subject: it is to the extent that ego cannot comprehend the phenomenon that this ego is 
constituted by it. The examples of the saturated phenomena can be found in various fields of the human activity: painting, 
revelation of the Divine, the givenness of truth, events of life, experience of flesh, the erotic phenomenon etc. Theory of 
the saturated phenomena was advanced in (Marion, 2001) and (Marion, 2003). 
23 One can quote S. Frank who made a comment that any attempt to remove this dichotomy in man or explain it away by 
means a materialistic regress in thinking leads ineluctably to the distorted anthropology and hence cosmology: man has a 
“dual nature, and every theory of life which fails to account of both aspects of his being is bound to be inadequate… The 
structure of our being is complex and antinomic, and all artificial simplification distorts it” (Frank, 1966: 34-35).
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Философские основания диалога  
между наукой и богословием
А.В. Нестерук 
Университет Портсмута
Англия, PO1 3HF, Портсмут, корпус Лайон Гэйт
В статье обсуждаются философские трудности осуществления диалога между наукой и бо-
гословием. Богословие имеет дело с явлениями типа событий, к которым неприменимы кри-
терии метафизики и онтологии. Таким образом, философия, осуществляющая посредниче-
ство между наукой и богословием, вынуждена включать в свой объем необъективируемые 
феномены, как рождение человека, любовь другого, ощущение своей плоти как единосущной 
всей вселенной, переживание событий Библейской истории и др. Расширение философии воз-
можно, если включить в состав ее данного содержание опыта богообщения, опосредованного 
эпистемологическими критериями расширенной «рациональности», исходящей из абсолютно-
го приоритета загадочности человека, его сознания и жизни вообще. Такое расширение фило-
софии, предполагающее отказ от трансцендентальной установки, выводит ее в принципи-
ально эмпирическую сферу, отбрасывая в сторону исходный вопрос о том, что может быть 
исследовано, а что нет. Различие между научным опытом и опытом религиозным в философ-
ских терминах показывает, что это различие является базовой характеристикой человече-
ского состояния, и его преодоление под видом «диалога» является экзистенциально несосто-
ятельным предприятием. Обсуждения различия в опыте мира и опыте Бога необходимы для 
дальнейшей артикуляции смысла человеческого состояния, но не его изменения.
Ключевые слова: антропология, богословие, герменевтика, жизнь, наука, опыт, событие, со-
причастие, феноменальность, философия, человек.
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